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The state of Michigan radically altered its school ﬁnance system in 1994. This was a legislature-
led reform that took place somewhat unexpectedly and without the intervention of any courts. The
new plan, called Proposal A, signiﬁcantly increased state aid to the lowest spending districts and
limited future increases in spending in the richest ones. I investigate the impact of Proposal A on
distribution of resources and educational outcomes in Michigan. In the process this paper oﬀers a
ﬁrst detailed look at the eﬀectiveness of a legislature-led school ﬁnance reform. Using panel data on
Michigan K-12 districts from 1990 to 2001, I ﬁnd that Proposal A was quite successful in reducing
inter-district spending disparities. The eﬀect on academic performance is more modest. Though
there is evidence of signiﬁcant gains by the lowest spending districts in state tests, as yet these do
not show up in nationwide tests like NAEP and ACT. The results are largely unchanged when I
use Indiana and Ohio as control states.
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In 1971 the California Supreme Court asked the state legislature to overhaul its public-school ﬁnance
system, arguing that the education of a child should not be a function of the wealth of its neighbors.
Since then, school ﬁnance reforms have become commonplace across the U.S. Michigan is among the
latest entrants to this group, having radically altered its school ﬁnancing rules in 1994. In this paper
I evaluate the Michigan school ﬁnance reform.
In most U.S. states, local property taxes are the major source of school revenues, and since
people often sort themselves among neighborhoods based on income, taxable property wealth diﬀers
substantially from district to district, even within the same state.1 School ﬁnance reforms are aimed
at weakening this nexus between district wealth and higher per pupil expenditures. They achieve
this typically by large increases in state aid to poorer districts, often coupled with restrictions on
spending in the richer ones.
The rationale behind such overhaul is that children in poorer districts may be lagging behind
others because of inadequate resources at their disposal. With education becoming more and more
important in a knowledge-driven economy, this is of immediate concern to parents and educators
alike. It is interesting to note here U.S. Supreme Court Judge Sandra O’Connor’s recent interview
where she suggested that some aﬃrmative action in U.S. universities was needed because in their
current position, U.S. schools were unable to bridge the socioeconomic divide.2 An important aspect
of school ﬁnance reforms is the fact that often a substantial share of the relevant population is aﬀected,
so potentially this can have large eﬀects on educational outcomes. On the other hand, critics of such
reforms argue that the way these are implemented - large windfalls to poorer districts - make it highly
unlikely that they will lead to any meaningful improvement for the students concerned (Hanushek,
1 See Table 1 in Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) for an illuminating example of inequalities within nearby commu-
nities.
2 Chicago Tribune, June 24, 2003.
11996).
In 1994, Michigan embarked on a comprehensive overhaul of its school ﬁnance program when it
enacted a new plan called Proposal A. This signiﬁcantly increased the state share of K-12 spending
and entailed large sums of money to the lowest spending districts, which were allowed to increase
their spending at a much faster rate than others. Concurrently, Proposal A also ended local discretion
over school spending. Given spending in 1993-94, the last year before the program, it is the state
that now decides by how much each district can raise its subsequent expenditures.
The theoretical literature about school spending concerns itself primarily with the diﬀerence
between local and state ﬁnance, and their implications for growth and inequality. In a Tiebout
model, where people sort themselves into neighborhoods based on their income, a local system
is believed to be preferable to a state system, if one is only concerned about available resources
to education and not their distribution.3 However, in an important contribution, Benabou (1996a)
notes the major (and hitherto neglected) role of complementarity between the educational production
function and human capital in the neighborhood (local ‘social capital’). He shows that, depending
on the strength of this complementarity, a move from local to state ﬁnancing may or may not be
welfare-improving. Benabou (1996b) explores the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of school ﬁnance systems
on growth and inequality in a dynamic framework. In the presence of credit market imperfections,
though there might be an inter-temporal tradeoﬀ under certain circumstances, the economy’s growth
rate is higher under a state system, assuming rational forward-looking agents.
The empirical studies undertaken so far fall under two broad groups - those that deal cross-
sectionally with many school ﬁnance reforms and those that study individual states. Among the
former, Murray et al (1998) conclude that court-mandated ﬁnance reforms have had a large positive
eﬀect on equalization of school resources.4 Card and Payne (2002) study not only the relative
3 See e.g. the calibration results in Fernandez and Rogerson (1999). This result assumes that the income elasticity
of demand for school expenditures is greater than the price elasticity.
4 However, they caution that the scope of these reforms is somewhat limited, since they cannot make a dent into
2equalization in spending across districts, but also its consequences for academic performance. They
ﬁnd that such reforms, which were successful in reducing inter-district disparities in spending, also
led to a convergence in SAT 5 scores across family background groups.
Among the case studies of individual states, Downes (1992) ﬁnds that in California there has
been a signiﬁcant convergence across school districts in per pupil expenditures, though it has not
been reﬂected in academic performance. For Vermont too, Downes ﬁnds that spending has become
much more equally distributed (2002).6 Guryan (2001), who studies the Massachusetts reforms of
1993, ﬁnds that the increase in spending due to an increase in state aid improved 4th grade test
scores, primarily through a better performance by low-scoring students. Clark (2003) ﬁnds that
the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 spurred signiﬁcant increases in spending in the lowest
spending districts, but still failed to produce gains in ACT performance.7
However, all these studies concern states where the ﬁnancing system was changed following di-
rectives from the courts. In Michigan, on the other hand, the campaign for reform was led by the
legislature and the executive.8 There is an as-yet unresolved issue in the school ﬁnance literature
about whether legislature-mandated changes can have real eﬀects. Evans et al (1997), based on
their analysis of 16,000 public school districts from 1972 to 1992, conclude that “reforms that were
initiated by the states without judicial prodding were typically ineﬀective”. Card and Payne (2002),
on the other hand, argue that even in these states, state aid is now becoming more targeted towards
the lower income districts.9 This is the ﬁrst paper to examine a legislature-led school ﬁnance reform
between-state inequalities which dominate within-state inequalities for the country as a whole.
5 SAT is the acronym for Scholastic Aptitude Test which, along with ACT, is the most popular college prep test in
the U.S.
6 Since the Vermont legislation was enacted only in 1997, it was considered too early to look at test scores.
7 The ACT assessment, known as the American College Testing Program till 1996, is America’s most widely
accepted college entrance examination. It is particularly important in the Midwestern and Southern states where it is
often required for admission to colleges.
8 The two court cases of the previous two decades, Milliken vs. Green (1973) and East Jackson Public Schools vs.
Michigan (1984), had both found the existing ﬁnance system constitutional.
9 See Table 4 in Card and Payne. Both studies use similar data, though Card and Payne only consider the change
between 1977 and 1992. The approach to the problem, and the empirical methodology, is however quite diﬀerent.
3closely, and should provide important evidence as to its eﬀectiveness.10
I begin by looking at the eﬀects on equalization of school spending. I ﬁnd that the program
was indeed quite successful on this count - by the end of the decade the lowest spending districts
had witnessed large increases in spending. Next I look at the trends in academic performance. I
employ various strategies, including using the changes in state aid formula as instruments for actual
spending, to estimate whether the lowest spending districts, the chief beneﬁciaries of this reform,
witnessed any additional improvements. The results based on tests administered by the state show
signiﬁcant test score gains by these districts. These gains are robust to alternative control groups,
and hold good when I look at the experience of two neighboring states, Indiana and Ohio. However,
there is not much evidence for any improved performance by these lowest spending districts in college
prep test (ACT). Neither is any relative improvement in nationally-conducted NAEP11 tests visible,
at least in mathematics.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 I outline the main features of
the Michigan program. Section 3 discusses the sources of the data used. In Section 4 I examine the
eﬀects of the program on equalization of school ﬁnances. Section 5 looks at the eﬀects on academic
performance. I begin with state tests conducted by the Michigan Department of Education, but I
supplement this with results from nationwide tests and compare the Michigan experience to those of
two neighboring states, Indiana and Ohio. Section 6 concludes.
10 Both of the cross-section studies mentioned above use data only up to 1992, so they exclude the Michigan reforms,
which were initiated only in 1994.
11 NAEP is the acronym for National Assessment of Educational Progress. It consists of tests in various grades and
subjects, conducted periodically across the U.S. states.
42 The Michigan Program
Since the Michigan program has been discussed at length elsewhere,12 I conﬁne myself to the main
features. As already mentioned, the program was not a response to any adverse court ruling or to a
sudden rise in public concern over inequalities. Rather, it was a by-product of the prevailing debate
over pervasively-high property taxes, whose main purpose was supporting local schools. In 1994, just
before the program, Michigan’s property tax burden was the seventh highest in the country and it
was 4th among U.S. states in the share of school spending ﬁnanced locally (61%).13 In March 1994
Michigan voters overwhelmingly ratiﬁed Proposal A, which reduced the reliance of school revenues
on property taxes, replacing them primarily by an increase in the sales tax from 4 to 6%. This
resulted in a large rise in the state share of K-12 spending, and was followed by eﬀorts to make a
signiﬁcant dent in existing inequalities.14
Prior to the reform, Michigan had been using a district power equalizing (DPE) formula, where
districts are allocated state funds based on their tax eﬀorts. This was intended to make the system
wealth-neutral,15 leaving the choice of millage rates (property tax rates) to the local districts, but
its equalizing power had considerably eroded over the years. In 1994 about one-third of all districts
were too rich to be aﬀected.
The new school spending plan, eﬀective from 1994-95, works as follows. First, the 1993-94 level
of spending in each district was taken as its base, and came to be called the district’s Foundation
Allowance (FA). Second, future increases in all districts’ FA’s were governed entirely by the state
12 See e.g., Addonizio et al (1995), Courant et al (1995) and Courant and Loeb (1997).
13 after New Hampshire (86%), Illinois (62%) and Vermont (61%) - subsequently, both Illinois and Vermont over-
hauled their school ﬁnance programs in 1997.
14 Taxes on homestead property came down from an average of 34 mills to a uniform statewide rate of 6 mills. The
tax on non-homestead property was reduced too, but kept at 24 mills. The share of the state in K-12 spending went
up quickly, from 31.3% in 1993 to 77.5% in 1997.
15 The idea behind wealth-neutrality is that high tax wealth in a district should not lead to high revenues except
through a higher tax eﬀort. In general, as preference for school spending is a positive function of income, this does not
equalize per pupil expenditures across districts, see Feldstein (1975).
5legislature - the lowest spending districts were allowed to increase spending at much faster rates
than their richer counterparts. In theory, over time this would lead to a substantial narrowing of
the revenue gap across districts. Further, all districts, however rich, were held harmless - none
suﬀered any absolute decline in per pupil spending. Table 1 shows the changes in expenditures in
six Michigan school districts in the post-reform period. The large catch-up exhibited by the lowest
spending districts is immediately evident.
Another feature of the Michigan program is that it abolishes, for all practical purposes, local con-
trol over future increases in spending. This is a controversial issue - Hoxby (1996, 2001) argues that
ﬁnance programs that tamper with local control over spending are harmful for school productivity
and decrease support for overall school spending. In her opinion, ﬁnance formulas should take the
form of ﬂat grants and not distort incentives.16
3D a t a
All the data that I use, except for the NAEP, are at the level of individual K-12 districts. Most
of these come from the Michigan Department of Education (henceforth, MDE). The revenue and
expenditure ﬁgures, as well as those on K-12 enrollment, teacher salaries and pupil-teacher ratios,
are taken from the Bulletin 1014’s, published annually.17 The data on ethnic and gender compositions
and free lunch eligibility (4th and 7th grades) come from the Pupil Headcount Files and the Food
and Nutrition Files of the MDE K-12 database.18 The MDE K-12 Database is also the source for
16 That is, if a district wishes to tax itself $1 to increase its school spending by $1, it should be allowed to do so.
The California experience provides much of the fodder for this debate. In the years after the Serrano II case (1976),
where the court ruled a diﬀerence of more than 200 dollars in spending between school districts to be unconstitutional,
California witnessed a drastic fall in per pupil expenditures. Some critics believe this to be a harmful fallout of the move
to a state system. There are other possible explanations though, such as a signiﬁcant rise in enrollment, particularly
of Hispanics, and Proposition 13, the 1978 tax limit bill which restricts increases in state expenditures.
17 I mostly use data on general fund revenues and general fund expenditures, these are broad measures that include
most categories of spending. For the exact deﬁnitions, see any of the Bulletin 1014’s.
18 Some of the data on ethnicity and free lunch eligibility for the early years come from the Common Core of Data
(CCD) of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
6the state test (Michigan Educational Assessment Program, henceforth MEAP) scores. I only use the
results for reading and mathematics (4th and 7th grades, percent scoring at or above the satisfactory
levels).
The data on median income of the school districts in 1989 come from the 1990 census, as published
in the School District Data Book. I also use the 1990 and 2000 censuses to look at changes in
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Michigan school districts. Data on ACT and
SAT participation and performance of Michigan school districts come from the Michigan website
of Standard and Poor’s School Evaluation Services. The NAEP test scores for Michigan and other
states are available on the NCES website.
The data on Indiana and Ohio come from the respective departments of education. For Ohio,
these have been extracted from the annual Local Report Cards, available for each district since 1996.
For Indiana, the K-12 School Data is the repository of much of the information. The measures of
spending used are General Expenditures for Indiana and Total Expenditures for Ohio, which are
broadly similar to General Fund Expenditures in Michigan.19 For test scores, I use results from 3rd
and 6th grades reading and mathematics in Indiana and 4th and 7th grades reading and mathematics
in Ohio.20
4 Eﬀect on School Spending
Table 2 shows the values of four common measures of spending inequality across districts - the Gini
coeﬃcient, the coeﬃcient of variation, the Theil index and the ratio of spending at the 95th and 5th
percentiles.21 The values are shown for 1994, the last year before the reform, and 2001, the last year
19 For Ohio, due to a change in deﬁnition, comparable ﬁgures are not available pre-1995. The expenditure data for
the early years have been generously provided by Jim Brown of the Ohio Department of Education.
20 For Indiana, the exact measure is total mean NCE (Normal Curve Equivalent) score, for Ohio, this is the percent
of students scoring at or above the proﬁcient level.
21 For the exact formulas and the advantages and disadvantages of each of these measures, see Murray et al (1998),
or Litchﬁeld (1999).
7in my analysis. For comparison, I also put estimates for Kentucky (1990-2000) and court-mandated
reforms in the last two columns.
There has been a large fall in each of the measures in Michigan after the reform. They look even
more impressive when compared to the corresponding estimates in the last two columns, since for
Michigan I am only looking at a seven year period.22 Because of the staggered nature of the program
in Michigan the measures should continue falling for several more years.23
An important feature of school ﬁnancing in the U.S. that troubles lawmakers, judges and educa-
tors alike is the fact that local school expenditures depend largely on district property wealth. Many
court cases, beginning with Serrano I in California (1971), have relied on this wealth-expenditure
relationship as a yardstick of existing inequality. To estimate this gradient for Michigan and the
eﬀect of the program, if any, I next regress school spending in 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2001 on district
median income.
Spendingst = α + α1 ∗ D94 + α2 ∗ D98 + α3 ∗ D01 + β0 ∗ MI + β1 ∗ (MI ∗ D94)
+β2 ∗ (MI ∗ D98) + β3 ∗ (MI ∗ D01) + controls + εst (1)
D94, D98, etc. are the respective year dummies. MI is the median income of the district in 1989. β0
measures the strength of the income-expenditure relationship in 1990, the ﬁrst year in my analysis.
β1 gives the change in this gradient between 1990 and 1994, the last year before the program. β2
and β3 show post-program changes, if any - together with β1 they give an idea of the eﬀectiveness
of the program in narrowing spending inequalities.
The results, in Table 3, show a large and positive relationship between district income and school
spending in 1990, which was only slightly diluted between then and 1994. Post-reform, however, there
22 Part of the reduction may have occurred even without the reforms. However, estimates from Table 3 below suggest
that pre-reform trends, though moving towards equalization, were not particularly large.
23 I only report the weighted statistics. For the unweighted statistics, the fall is even greater (except in the Gini),
presumably due to the fact that most of the lowest spending districts are relatively small (see Table 4).
8has been a very signiﬁcant weakening - in fact, for the unweighted estimates, the income-expenditure
relationship is slightly negative in 2001.24
To examine whether Proposal A actually equalized expenditures in Michigan I classify the 524
K-12 districts into 5 equal groups based on the 1993-94 level of spending (Group 1 consists of the
lowest spending 105, and so on).25 Some summary statistics on these groups of districts are shown
in Table 4. The lowest spending districts are overwhelmingly white, mostly rural and small, and
have a high proportion of free lunch students. They also perform signiﬁcantly worse than the highest
spending districts in 4th grade tests, though the diﬀerences from the other groups is not that large.
Figure 1 shows the spending distributions for Groups 1 and 5 in 1994 and 2001. The top panel
shows changes in revenues, the lower one is for expenditures.26 There seems to have been a signiﬁcant
convergence between these groups post-reform. To formally compare the trends in spending in these
diﬀerent groups, pre and post-reform, I next run the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) regression
Ysgt = α + αs + β0 ∗ t +
g=4 
g=1
βg ∗ (Dg ∗ t)+γ0 ∗ (reform)+
g=4 
g=1
γg ∗ (Dg ∗ reform)+
θ0 ∗ (reform∗ t)+
g=4 
g=1
θg ∗ (Dg ∗ reform∗ t)+δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (2)
Ysgt is the general fund revenue (GFR) or general fund expenditure (GFE) of district s in group g in
year t. αs is the district ﬁxed eﬀect while Xsgt are the time-varying characteristics.27 Dg’s are the
dummy variables for the respective groups. Group 5, comprising of the highest spending districts, is
24 Similar large declines have been observed for some of the states with court-mandated reforms. Downes (1992)
reports that in California the estimated coeﬃcient on district income fell from 6.70 in 1977 to 1.00 in 1986. Clark
(2003) ﬁnds that in Kentucky this fell from -4.38 to -38.27 between 1990 and 2000.
25 Note that future increases in foundation allowances were monotonically related to this base level of spending. I
experimented with a variety of alternative classiﬁcations, such as grouping the districts such that there are an equal
number of K-12 students in each group. The results are qualitatively similar. This is also true when I classify the
districts based on their spending in 1990 - not surprising, since the correlations in spending between the two years is
very high.
26 These show the kernel smoothed plots of general fund expenditures in the two groups of districts. All ﬁgures have
been weighted by district enrollment.
27 Since free lunch data for 1990 and 1991 are either not available or not reliable, I have only included ethnic
composition in Xsgt. Running the regression on a sub-sample when data on both controls are available does not change
the qualitative results.
9the omitted category. ‘Reform’ is a binary variable, taking the value 0 pre-reform and 1 afterwards. t
is a time-trend, equal to 0 in 1994, 1 in 1995 and so on. In this speciﬁcation, θg’s give the diﬀerences
in post-reform trends over and above the diﬀerences in βg’s, the pre-reform trends - they can thus
be interpreted as a sort of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate for trends.
I use annual data from 1990 to 2001, which straddle 1994, the last year before the reforms. The
results are in Table 5.28 The gap between the highest spending and the lowest spending districts
had been increasing in the years before the program. In fact there was a clear hierarchy - the richer
a group, the higher its growth rate. Post-reform however, this has completely reversed itself. The
reform seems to have been instrumental in raising spending in Groups 1 and 2 in both absolute and
relative terms. This result looks robust, and holds for both revenues and expenditures.2930
In order to see whether the increases in spending have been translated into real inputs, the
last two columns of Table 5 show the corresponding trends for teacher salaries and student-teacher
ratios. The trends for teacher salaries mirror those for revenues and expenditures - there seem to
have been a signiﬁcant narrowing of the gap between Group 1 and Group 5 districts post-reform.
As for spending, this looks more impressive when compared to the divergent trends just prior to the
program. For student-teacher ratios however, the lowest spending districts were improving in the
pre-reform period too, and there is not much of a change following the program.
To sum, the evidence points to a substantial program eﬀect on equalization of school ﬁnances and
teacher salaries across diﬀerent districts. I next examine whether this aﬀected academic performance.
28 The OLS results, not reported, are very similar. In addition, I experimented with a variety of samples, often
excluding the very small and the very large districts. The results were similar.
29 One thing to note is that in general, when revenues are increasing fast, expenditures often lag behind - conversely,
limits on the revenue side may not constrain expenditures by as much. This is true in both the pre and post-reform
period.
30 The results are also similar if I consider another widely used measure of spending viz., current operating expendi-
tures. The only thing to note is that for the lowest spending districts, current operating expenditures in the post-reform
period lag behind general fund expenditures.
105 Eﬀect on Test Scores
Though from a moral or a judicial point of view, diﬀerences in spending across schools are undesirable
in themselves, the practical importance of school ﬁnance reforms stems from their likely eﬀect on
academic performance. If students in lowest spending districts are lagging behind others because of a
lack of adequate resources, then equalization of spending brought about by programs like Michigan’s
can spur signiﬁcant gains in achievement.31 In this section I document the changes in student
performance in post-reform Michigan, as measured by standardized test scores. I begin with the
MEAP tests, which are administered in all Michigan school districts.
5.1 MEAP
5.1.1 Trends in Test Scores across Diﬀerent Groups of Districts
Figure 2 shows the distributions of 4th grade test scores (reading and mathematics) in Groups 1
and 5 in 1995 and 2001. There seems to have been some convergence post-reform, though it is less
pronounced than that for spending. To formally estimate changes in student performance in post-
reform Michigan32 I ﬁrst employ two variants of equation (2) - one where I do not separately control
for diﬀerences in pre-reform trends across groups, the other controlling for such diﬀerences. However,
in most of these regressions, the restrictions involving linearity of the time trends are rejected, so
I instead run regressions allowing for unrestricted year eﬀects. I run three variants of these - ﬁrst,
with only a common pre-reform trend across groups, second, controlling for diﬀerences in pre-reform
trends in a linear way, and third, running a completely non-linear speciﬁcation. Because the results
31 Apart from the direct eﬀect of increased resources, there may be an indirect eﬀect operating through increases
in school eﬀort - see Appendix I for a theoretical digression of whether public school eﬀort should go up following a
ﬁnance reform.
32 As a ﬁrst pass at the data, I regressed 4th grade test scores for various years on district median income from
the 1990 census to estimate the income-test score gradient. The results are suggestive of a positive movement towards
equality in the second half of the decade, however, it does not appear that the widespread success of the Michigan
reforms in narrowing spending gaps was replicated in test scores.
11are quite similar, I only report the results from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, which is
Tsgt = α0 + αs + β0 ∗ t + β96,0 ∗ D96 + .... + β01,0 ∗ D01 +
g=4 
g=1




β01,g ∗ (Dg ∗ D01) + δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (3)
Here β0 is the overall trend, while β96,0, β97,0, etc. give the year eﬀects for the post-reform years. I
am interested in the group-year interaction terms β96,g’s, β97,g’s, etc. - positive values of these for
the lowest spending groups would be evidence that the program has helped to equalize test scores.
Because from Table 4, it seems that the Group 5 districts were somewhat diﬀerent from Groups 1
and 2, it is possible that they would have followed diﬀerent paths even in the absence of any program.
So instead of omitting Group 5 as earlier I now use Group 4 as my omitted category.33
Table 6 reports the results. For ease of comparison, I show the estimated coeﬃcients on spending
in the ﬁrst two columns.34 For mathematics, there is some evidence for improvements in the later
years. Though there is not a strict hierarchy the coeﬃcients are suggestive of an improving trend.
The same seems to be true for reading if one leaves out the sudden deterioration in 2000. In the
immediate pre-reform period Group 1 had a negative trend for reading, controlling for this would
make the estimates much higher.
The evidence is suggestive of an improved performance by the lowest spending districts later in
the decade, though there are considerable diﬀerences from year to year. However, looking at trends
in scores for a particular grade is not the ideal way to gauge gains in achievement - among other
things, it cannot control for any idiosyncratic cohort-speciﬁc shocks across districts. I next present
a cohort-based measure, which controls for this and is a proxy for arguably the best way of judging
gains in achievement, viz., comparing test scores for the same student over time.
33 When I assign the diﬀerent districts percentile ranks based on their performance in 4th grade tests in 1994, the
distribution of ranks within Groups 1 and 2 seem quite similar to that within Group 4.
34 I show the results for two samples - the ﬁrst includes all 524 districts, the second excludes Detroit. Exclusion of
Detroit changes the result somewhat since Detroit belongs to Group 4, which is now the omitted category or control
group.
125.1.2 Cohort-based Analysis of Test Score Gains
In Michigan, students are tested in reading and mathematics both in grades 4 and 7. I now test
for improvements in academic performance by looking at the experience of particular cohorts. For
each group of districts and for each cohort, I ﬁrst measure the improvement between grades 4 and 7.
Then I compare the improvement in the lowest spending districts with that in the higher spending
ones.
The idea is that if the reforms have had a direct eﬀect on test scores, then cohorts in the lowest
spending districts would exhibit higher growth rates, and these gains would be progressively higher
as one moves onto more recent cohorts, which would have spent more years under the program.
I begin with the cohort that was in the 4th grade in 1993. These kids would be in grade 7 in
1996, the second year of the reforms, and hence would be aﬀected for little more than a year.35 The
cohort in grade 4 in 1994 would similarly experience a little more than 2 years under the program.
The next cohort, in grade 4 in 1995, would be aﬀected for the entire period. However, if there are
some lag eﬀects, as seems likely, it may be the next cohorts (4th graders in 1996, 1997, etc.) that
show the most improvement.
For each cohort, I run both OLS and FE regressions. For example, for the cohort in 4th grade in
1993 (and in 7th grade in 1996), the FE equation is
Tsgt = α0 + αs + β0 ∗ t +
g=4 
g=1
βg ∗ (Dg ∗ t)+δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (4)
where Tsgt is the 4th grade test score for t=1993, and the 7th grade test score for t=1996. I run (4)
for each cohort and record the coeﬃcients β1 and β2. As earlier, Group 4 is the omitted category.
The results are given in Table 7, which reports β1 and β2 for the 5 cohorts (4th graders in 1993,
35 Ideally I should begin with a cohort unaﬀected by the program. However, data on the control variables are not
available for the only previous year with 4th grade test score data (1991, mathematics) - further, inclusion of this
cohort does not change any of the results qualitatively.
131994, 1995, 1996 and 1997).36 An increasing trend in these coeﬃcients can be construed as evidence
in favor of the program.
For reading, the gains (between the 4th and 7th grades) for Groups 1 and 2 in the early years
were signiﬁcantly less than those of Group 4. But the diﬀerences narrowed down, and for the later
years the coeﬃcients are either mostly positive (Group 1) or only modestly negative (Group 2). The
results for mathematics are similar - here the improvements seem to follow a rough trend, both for
Groups 1 and 2. Figure 3 shows the estimated coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent cohorts, together with
the 95% conﬁdence interval bands.
These results on cohort-based gains are particularly interesting, since they seem to reﬂect what
one would expect if one were to believe that ‘money matters.’ I now present some direct evidence
on the eﬀects of increased expenditures on test scores.
5.1.3 Instrumental Variables Estimates of Eﬀect of Spending on Test Scores
In 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 I divided the Michigan K-12 districts into 5 groups, and compared the respective
post-program evolutions. An alternative way to proceed for test scores would be as follows. Note
that the “treatment” here takes the form of state-mandated foundation allowance (FA), which in
turn is closely related to district revenues and expenditures.
The basic equation relating test scores (Tst) to district spending (GFEst, general fund expendi-
tures) can be written as 37
Tst = α0 + αs + βt + φ ∗ GFEst + δ ∗ Xst + εst (5)
If the coeﬃcient φ for the post-reform years is positive and large one may assume the improvement in
36 As earlier, I present estimates from two diﬀerent samples. Since test scores for 1993 and 1994 are not available
for Detroit, I instead show the results for a sample that omits the largest districts (districts with more than 800 4th
grade students).
37αs is the district ﬁxed eﬀect while βt is the year eﬀect
14test scores to be causally related to spending. This in turn can be taken to be a measure of success for
the program, since GFE is closely related to the actual treatment intensity (FA). However, OLS or
FE on (5) may give inconsistent results. Consistency here requires district spending to be orthogonal
to all the determinants of test scores excluded from this equation - an assumption whose veracity
may be in doubt.38
Use of instrumental variables provides one way out. In this case I can instrument district GFE
by the state-mandated foundation allowance, which meets the two valid criteria for an instrument.
First, as is seen later, the foundation allowances are very closely correlated with district expenditures.
Second, since it is determined at the state level, FA should not be correlated with the unobserved
determinants of test performance at the district level.
Note however that the state-mandated FAs, though following clear-cut rules set out in advance,
are monotonic functions of school spending in the base year, 1994. Thus our maintained hypothesis,
which is that FA should not aﬀect test scores except through their eﬀect on current expenditures,
boils down to the following - 1994 spending should not aﬀect test scores from 1996 onwards except
through its eﬀect on current spending. As is obvious, this may not always hold if there are some lag
eﬀects.
But note that I am primarily looking at 4th grade test scores. So it is plausible to assume that
any expenditure incurred by the district before the current 4th graders began attending school will
only have negligible eﬀects. That is, I can restrict attention to 4th grade scores from 1998 onwards -
these 4th graders would be in grade 1 in 1995 or later, and should presumably not be aﬀected much
by 1994 expenditures (except in as much as it aﬀects current spending). I report results for both
periods, 1996-2001 and 1998-2001.
Another problem with using the changes in foundation allowances as instruments, where these
38 This is true even for FE, which controls for all unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time.
15depend on district spending in 1994, is the following. Districts at diﬀerent points of the spending
distribution may be diﬀerent from each other in a way that is not entirely captured by a district
ﬁxed eﬀect. Ideally, if there were enough non-linearities in the state aid formula one could control for
any smooth (linear) eﬀects of base spending while at the same time exploiting the sharp changes to
estimate eﬀects of spending on test scores. However, such a strategy would not have adequate power
in Michigan where the discontinuities are not large enough. I instead curtail my sample, excluding
the highest spending districts since they look somewhat diﬀerent from the other groups.39
As a further check, I use two diﬀerent (but close) sets of instruments. The IV(1) estimates present
results from regressions where I instrument the changes in spending with the changes in foundation
allowances. For IV(2) estimates I use the group indicators (dummies), and interactions of the group
indicators with the year dummies, as instruments. Intuitively, the latter is a way of rescaling the
group eﬀects I found earlier in dollar terms.
A ﬁnal concern is that of discretionary spending by the state. School districts may lobby hard
for extra funds and depending on their bargaining power some of them may indeed be successful.
However, it seems reasonable to conclude that such spending would not be reﬂected in the foundation
allowances, which are based on a ﬁxed set of rules. Second, the magnitude of such spending can be
expected to be more important from 2001-02 onwards when the passage of No Child Left Behind
increased the stakes for states with a large number of failing schools.40
Table 9 shows the results of the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the IV estimates.41 As expected,
foundation allowances are highly signiﬁcant and seem to be the major determinant of per pupil
expenditures in the post-reform period.
39 As is shown later (Table 10), between the 1990 and 2000 censuses Group 5 evolved somewhat diﬀerently from the
other groups.
40 Since the passing standards in Michigan are higher than in most states, Michigan has a large number of ‘failing’
schools.
41 For brevity, I only show the results for two samples, and for the IV-FE(1) estimates, the other results are
qualitatively similar.
16Table 8 shows the results of the OLS and FE regressions of equation (5), and of the second stage
regressions of the IV estimation.42 The upper half shows the results for reading, the lower half is for
mathematics. Considering the OLS estimates, the eﬀect of lagged spending is seen to be positively
signiﬁcant only in Panel A, which shows the unweighted estimates. The same is true for OLS-IV(1)
estimates, which are qualitatively similar to the OLS results.43
The FE estimates are quite close to the simple OLS estimates, particularly for 1996-2001. How-
ever, as often happens, the IV-FE estimates are larger and sometimes highly signiﬁcant. These imply
a modest eﬀect of spending on performance. For example, for reading, the estimates in Panel C,44
imply an increase of between 2 and 5 percentage points for every $1000. With an in-sample standard
deviation of about 14, this translates to about 0.15-0.40 standard deviations increase per $1000 of
extra spending.45 For mathematics, the estimates in Panel C imply an increase of between 6 and 8
percentage points for every $1000 - an increase of 0.40-0.55 in standard deviations.46
To put these estimates into perspective, I note the results from some recent studies of state
interventions in schooling. Krueger (1999) reports that smaller class sizes (about a third reduction)
in the Tennessee STAR project resulted in about 0.28-0.22 standard deviations increase in test scores
per year. Rouse (1998) reports that low-income, minority students who participated in the Milwaukee
voucher program had annual eﬀect sizes of the order of 0.08-0.12 standard deviations.47 Guryan ﬁnds
that in Massachusetts 4th grade test scores increased by about 0.50 standard deviation in average
district scores due to an increase of about $1000 in spending (Guryan, 2001). Hoxby (2002), who in
her study of charter schools in Michigan uses the same MEAP data, ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant threat of
42 All the nominal variables used below - general fund expenditures and foundation allowances - have been deﬂated
using the consumer price index for Midwest Urban, available on the website of the Bureau of Labor Standards. The
coeﬃcients and their standard errors are in terms of 10
−1.
43 For brevity, I do not report the OLS-IV(2) estimates.
44 my preferred speciﬁcation
45 The standard deviations for reading scores for 1996-2001 and 1998-2001 are 14.32 and 13.63 respectively.
46The standard deviations for 1996-2001 and 1998-2001 are 14.88 are 13.31 respectively.
47 This is only for mathematics, she does not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects in reading.
17charter competition increases 4th grade reading and mathematics scores in public schools annually
by 0.23 and 0.07 standard deviations respectively.
My estimates imply an eﬀect of between 0.15-0.40 standard deviations for reading and 0.40-0.55
standard deviations for mathematics. This is for an increase in real per pupil expenditure of $1000 -
typically even the lowest spending districts in Michigan would have seen such increase over a period
of about four years.48 Thus this boils down to roughly a quarter to well over half a standard deviation
increase over four years. This is a modest to large eﬀect.
To sum, though one can be a bit skeptical of the IV estimates because of the reasons mentioned
above, the results generally suggest that the increases in spending led to some improvements in
academic performance. Before I proceed further I perform some robustness checks.49
5.1.4 Robustness of the Results
First I looked at the changes in the Michigan school districts between the two censuses. If over time
the lowest spending districts are evolving diﬀerently from the rest, then it is likely that some of the
improvement in test scores is due to this factor, rather than increases in school resources or school
eﬀort.50 Table 10 shows the results from FE regressions of diﬀerent socioeconomic characteristics on
a time-trend t and t interacted with the 4 group dummies. Group 1 is now the omitted category.
Overall, there is not much diﬀerence in the time-paths of the diﬀerent groups, except Group 5. This
is true both for demographic characteristics as well as economic ones. All districts witnessed modest
to large increases in population, per capita income and in the proportion of adults with at least a
bachelor’s degree. The poverty and employment variables also changed favorably. But generally, the
48 The foundation allowances for the lowest spending districts were increasing by about $300 per year, cumulated
over four years and appropriately deﬂated, this should be roughly around $1000.
49 Most of these results are not reported, but they are available from the author on request.
50 Note that I control for ethnicity and free lunch eligibility in my regressions - changes in these will mostly be
accounted for. Further, some of the changes in the 2000 census may be a result of the reform itself, since choosing
neighborhoods on the basis of desirable schools has long been commonplace in the U.S.
18lowest spending districts do not seem to have done any better than Groups 3 and 4.
Second, I repeated my earlier exercises (in 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) using Group 5 as the control. The
results are stronger - there were signiﬁcant improvements by the lowest spendingdistricts post-reform,
particularly in later years (see Figure 2). When I similarly use Group 3 as the control, the results
are somewhat diluted, but Group 1 districts still exhibit considerable improvements, particularly in
the cohort-based analysis.
The rapid spread of charter schools in Michigan may have contaminated some of my results.
Michigan instituted these reforms regarding school choice in the mid ’90s, along with the sweep-
ing changes in school ﬁnancing.51 Many commentators believe that the beneﬁcial eﬀect of charter
schools will spill over to students who remain in traditional public schools, by increasing the latter’s
productivity in the face of intense competition for students. In fact, Hoxby (2002) argues that in
Michigan this is exactly what happened - districts that witnessed sprouting up of charter schools
increased their productivity at a faster rate than others not similarly threatened.
However, even though charter schools have spread very rapidly in Michigan,52 they still serve only
a fraction of overall K-12 students (see Table 11, last row). Second, the presence of charter schools
would bias some of my results only if it were true that these schools are relatively more concentrated
in the lowest spending districts. However, the opposite is true in Michigan. The lowest spending
groups (Groups 1 and 2) are predominantly rural, and given that charter schools mostly serve urban
city children it is not surprising that they are located mostly in the richer districts.53 Table 11
shows the growth of charter schools across the diﬀerent groups in Michigan. For each of the years,
51 There is also a small inter-district choice program in Michigan - in 2000 and 2001 e.g., 17,440 and 26,024 students
enrolled in public schools outside their home district (about 1% and 1.5% of Michigan’s total public enrollment,
respectively). See Arsen et al, 2001. A proposal to introduce vouchers was however defeated in the 2000 elections.
52 The proportion of Michigan public school students enrolled in charter schools is third highest in the nation, after
Arizona and Washington D.C.
53 The demand for such schools is presumably higher is urban areas where public schools are often seen to be ‘failing.’
Another reason may be that in Michigan most of the charters are granted by state universities, so some of the schools
are located near these universities (Bettinger, 1999).
19the percentage of students enrolled in charter schools is the smallest in the lowest spending districts
and vice versa. In fact, if the story about increased competition from charter schools encouraging
increased eﬀort in public schools is indeed true, my results would be an underestimate - since I
am netting out the improvement in the Group 4 districts as a common shock to all districts, I am
discarding more test score gains in the lowest spending districts than I actually should.
To sum, controlling for factors like charter schools and selective migration across school districts
does not seem to aﬀect the results substantially. The same is true when I consider alternate compari-
son groups. The exact results are somewhat magniﬁed or diluted but the overall picture is unchanged
- there were signiﬁcant improvements by the lowest spending districts post-reform, particularly in
later years.
If valid, the above will be an important argument in favor of Michigan-like programs. While
not ruling out substantial ineﬃciencies in the utilization of additional funds in Michigan, it seems
that lack of resources may have been partially responsible in holding down achievement in some
districts. However, two caveats should be mentioned. First, the ’90s witnessed an across-the-board
rise in public concern for K-12 education, and some of the eﬀects seen so far may not be unique to
Michigan. To get some idea of the strength of these forces I compare the Michigan experience to
those in two neighboring states, Indiana and Ohio. Second, so far I have relied exclusively on the
MEAP test scores as my measure of educational progress. Focusing solely on results from a state
assessment may however be misleading. In Michigan the MEAP results are highly publicized 54 and
there may be incentives for teachers and administrators to boost their test scores artiﬁcially - several
such phenomena like “teaching to the test”, transferring regular students to special categories, even
outright cheating, have been noted by researchers for other states (see e.g. Figlio and Getzler (2002),
Jacob and Levitt (2003)). So I supplement my analysis by looking at two tests that largely avoid
54 though they are not literally ‘high stakes’ as in some other states, there are awards (Governor’s Cup) for districts
that turn in the best performances
20the above pitfalls, NAEP and ACT, in section 5.3.
5.2 Experience of Neighboring States
I compare the Michigan experience to those of two neighboring states, viz. Indiana and Ohio, to
check for any potential bias in the results.55
5.2.1 Equalization of School Spending
First I brieﬂy look at changes in school spending. Table 12 shows the trends in spending across
diﬀerent groups of districts in each state in the 1995-2000 period.56 Michigan’s superior performance
is immediately evident. In Indiana and Ohio the lowest spending groups move mostly in line with
their richer counterparts, or exhibit catch-up which is modest by Michigan’s standards. It seems that
Proposal A was responsible for at least a major part of the relative equalization of school ﬁnances
seen in post-1995 Michigan.57
5.2.2 Eﬀect on Academic Performance
The next step is to look for changes in school performance across the three states. The ﬁrst problem
that arises in this context is ensuring comparability of the test results. The particular measures
used - percent scoring at or above the satisfactory level (Michigan), percent scoring at or above
the proﬁcient level (Ohio) and mean NCE 58 score (Indiana) - are diﬀerent for diﬀerent states.
55 See Appendix II for why these two states were chosen.
56 As in Michigan, I divide Indiana and Ohio districts into ﬁve groups each, based on their 1995 spending.
57 I also ran OLS regressions of district spending on district median income (1990 census) to estimate the income-
expenditure gradient in each state. For Indiana, which already had a negative gradient in 1990, this has fallen further
between 1995 and 2000. However, part of this decline seems due to trends existing prior to 1995. For Ohio, the picture
is similar to Michigan’s - a large drop in the gradient for the unweighted estimates, though for the weighted estimates,
the decline is relatively modest. However, part of the improvement may also be due to the changes enacted after a
1997 court ruling or to pre-existing trends. The change in Michigan looks particularly impressive in view of the fact
that prior to 1994 there do not seem to have been any deﬁnite trends towards convergence.
58 Normal Curve Equivalent
21Unfortunately, either these are the only measures for which continuous data are available, or the
other available measures are very similar.
The second problem is to ensure comparability of the respective groups. For example, unlike in
Michigan and Ohio, the lowest spending group in Indiana is among the best performers in the state,
while the higher spending groups lag behind.
For these reasons, even though I take eﬀorts to create appropriate comparison groups in each
state59 the results are only suggestive. For brevity these are not reported, but are available from
the author on request. To summarize, lowest spending school districts in Indiana and Ohio do not
seem to exhibit test score gains that match those in Michigan. The results are similar whether I
look at the trends in test scores for a particular grade, or perform a cohort-based analysis, focusing
on the improvements between the 4th and 7th grades (Michigan), 3rd and 6th grades (Indiana) and
4th and 6th grades (Ohio). There is evidence of a modest mean-reversion in either state. But this is
unlikely to explain much of the improvement in Michigan - ﬁrst because the initial performance gap
between the groups was quite small, and second, because the improvements there seem to follow a
rough trend.
5.3 Performance in Nationwide Tests
Finally, I examine whether the gains seen so far show up in alternate measures of achievement. I
show results for two important nationwide tests, viz. NAEP and ACT.
5.3.1 NAEP Performance
NAEP consists of tests conducted periodically on a nationwide basis. Michigan participated in all
of the mathematics assessments conducted by NAEP since 1990 (1990, 1992, 1996 and 2000). It
59 based on their average percentile ranks as well as base year spending
22also participated in all the three reading assessments (1992, 1994 and 1998) - however, the minimum
participating guidelines were not met in 1994.
I analyze the NAEP trends for Michigan, and compare them to the corresponding trends for
Indiana, Ohio and the Nation.60 Since the results for reading are available only for 1992 and 1998,
which straddle 1995 - I conﬁne myself to mathematics (4th and 8th grades).61 Moreover, since I am
mostly interested in the bottom half of the distribution, I show the scores for selected categories -
the average scores, those at the 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles, and the percentages scoring at or
above the Basic and Proﬁcient levels. I also include the scores for Black and Hispanic students.
Table 13 shows the change in scale scores in Michigan over and above that in the control state
or region.62 One can get a rough idea of the eﬀectiveness of the reform by comparing the change
between 1996 and 2000 with the corresponding change between 1992 and 1996. Most of the 1996-2000
changes with respect to Indiana and the Nation are negative, as are the 1992-2000 changes relative
to Ohio. For grade 8 the results weigh even more overwhelmingly against a relative improvement in
the later half of the decade.
Thus, there does not seem to be much of a positive eﬀect of the ﬁnance reform on NAEP scores.63
However, many of the trends seem to reﬂect a move towards convergence than anything else.64 This
is also true for the individual ethnic groups - Michigan witnessed modest to large relative gains
between 1992 and 1996 for Blacks but most of these were lost between 1996-00. The converse is true
for the Hispanics.
60 Ohio did not participate in the mathematics tests in 1996.
61 Even if there are gains for Michigan in reading between 1992 and 1998, it would be diﬃcult to ascribe it to pre or
post-reform with any degree of certainty.
62 For example, between 1992 and 1996, scale scores for grade 4 mathematics increased by 6 points in Michigan but
only 3 points in the Nation. So Michigan’s net improvement is +3 with respect to the Nation.
63 If we consider Central as a comparison group (not shown) then Michigan does have a positive ‘program eﬀect’.
64 For example, large net improvements for Michigan seem to be followed by net declines; whereas large relative
declines, like for Hispanic between 1992 and 1996 seem to be followed by large improvements or small declines. The
evidence for converging trends is all the more strong if I look at the 1990-92 changes for grade 8 (not shown) and
compare those to the 1992-96 changes.
235.3.2 ACT Performance
Across the nation, most college-bound students appear in at least one of the two college entrance
tests, SAT and ACT. In Michigan, as in most Midwestern states, ACT is more common - I check if
the reforms have had any eﬀect on ACT taking and performance.
The underlying idea is that since students mostly take the ACT in their 12th grade, kids taking
the exam in later years would have been exposed to the program for a larger number of years. For
example, someone taking the exam in 1997 would have spent only about 2 years under the reforms,
but someone taking the same exam in 2001 would have been exposed for 6 years. So beneﬁcial
eﬀects of the ﬁnance reform, if any, would show up as gains for the more recent cohorts in the lowest
spending districts.
I run OLS and FE regressions, allowing for unrestricted year eﬀects. The FE equation is,
ACTsgt = α + αs + β98,0 ∗ D98 + .... + β01,0 ∗ D01 +
g=4 
g=1




β01,g ∗ (Dg ∗ D01) + δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (6)
To control for any secular changes that may diﬀerentially aﬀect the various groups, I use Indiana
as the control state.65 In Indiana, however, the more important college entrance test is SAT, not
ACT. As earlier, I take Group 4 as the control in Michigan since in terms of participation and
performance in the base year (1997), Group 4 is much closer to Groups 1 and 2 than Group 5. In
Indiana too I use Group 4 as the control, since Group 5, the richest group, has a SAT participation
rate that is signiﬁcantly lower than those of Groups 1 and 2 and also scores well below other groups.66
Table 14 presents the estimates from regressions of equation (6). The ﬁrst three columns show
the changes in ACT and SAT participation rates between 1997 and 2001. There is no evidence of
65 Data on college prep tests are not available for Ohio, so here I focus only on Indiana and Michigan.
66 The ACT participation rate of Group 5 districts, on the other hand, is much higher than those of Groups 1 and 2.
24any positive impact of the reform on the lowest spending districts in Michigan. Though most of the
coeﬃcients on Groups 1 and 2 are positive they are small in magnitude, never signiﬁcant and do not
show any trends towards improvement. In Indiana, there is no evidence of any signiﬁcant changes
in SAT participation rates. For ACT participation rates, there seems to be an improving trend for
the poorest districts. However, Group 1 districts had signiﬁcantly lower rates of ACT participation
in 1997, so part of the improvement is presumably a reversion to the mean.
The last three columns of Table 14 report the results for ACT and SAT scores.67 The Michigan
ACT results show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences from Group 4. Though for Group 1 the coeﬃcients in
the later years are less negative, the diﬀerences are minimal and never signiﬁcant. The same is true
in Indiana, where neither for ACT nor for SAT is there any evidence of improved performance by
the lowest spending districts.
To sum, it is somewhat puzzling that the improvement seen earlier for the lowest spending
districts in Michigan have not yet been reﬂected in these nationwide tests. However, two caveats
should be mentioned. First, the NAEP scores are compiled at an aggregate level, and this may mask
important changes within districts or regions in a state. Though I have tried to use those indicators
where improvement would have been most expected, this is only suggestive.68 Second, it may be too
early to expect sizeable improvements in ACT measures. Even the most recent cohort included here
would have spent just about half of its school life under the reforms.69
67 For brevity I only show the results for SAT mathematics, the results for SAT verbal scores are similar.
68 This is all the more so since the lowest spending districts are on average much smaller - in a sample of 100 Michigan
students, for example, only about 24 would belong to Groups 1 and 2. Detroit, on the other hand, would alone account
for 10 students.
69 A recent study by Arizona State University (ASU) researchers has found that, in states with ‘high-stakes’ state
tests, “while students show considerable improvement on .. state exams, the opposite is typically true of their perfor-
mance on other, independent measures of academic achievement” (The New York Times, December 28, 2002). The
‘other, independent measures’ referred to here include NAEP, SAT and ACT tests. It is interesting that this may be
true of a state like Michigan, which does not have a high-stakes testing regime. (The results of the ASU study have
since been disputed, see e.g. Raymond and Hanushek, 2003).
256 Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper I have studied the Michigan school ﬁnance reforms. In 1994, somewhat unexpectedly
and without the prodding of any courts, Michigan initiated a drastic overhaul of its school ﬁnancing
system. Among other things, Proposal A entailed large sums of money over the next few years
to the lowest spending districts, and largely ended local control over total school spending. Using
data for both the pre and post-reform periods, I ﬁnd that the program has been quite successful in
reducing inequalities of school spending. Though some inequalities exist, because of the staggered
nature of the reforms, these are no longer considered a matter of signiﬁcant concern.
The bulk of the paper is devoted to an analysis of academic performance in the years after the
program. I tried to see whether improvements in test scores followed the large increase in resources
witnessed by the lowest spending districts. Based on the MEAP tests conducted by the state
department of education, it seems that there was some signiﬁcant improvement in these districts,
which had erstwhile been lagging behind. However, the improvements do not seem to have spilled
over to other areas, like participation and performance in ACT or in NAEP (Mathematics). This
conclusion remains largely unchanged when I look at the experience of two neighboring states,
Indiana and Ohio.
These ﬁndings have signiﬁcant policy implications. First, these show that state legislatures can
initiate and implement a comprehensive school ﬁnance reform, even one which is largely redistrib-
utive in nature. Second, it is interesting to note the signiﬁcant academic progress registered by
the lowest spending districts in the post-reform period. However, and third, the gains in student
achievement look relatively modest, particularly when compared to the large increases in spending.
It seems that even complete equalization of school resources across districts will not be enough
to ensure complete equality in school outcome measures. One may have to look beyond school
ﬁnancing to issues of school eﬀort and favorable peer group quality.
26A school ﬁnance reform has many eﬀects, only some of which have been addressed in this paper.
Among the other eﬀects mentioned in the literature are the following. First, there are the possible
eﬀects on stratiﬁcation across school districts 70 - community compositions may change as a result
of the reform, and may get reﬂected in housing prices. Second, the move to state-level ﬁnancing
(implicit consolidation of school districts) may reduce the productivity of public schools ala Hoxby
(1996). Third, there are the eﬀects on spending in general - the substitution of local control by
state-mandated spending may lead to a decline in average school expenditures in the state as a
whole. It may also lead to increases in private school enrollment, as in California.71
A related question is the eﬀect of the reform on academic performance in the highest spending
districts. These districts were constrained by Proposal A and as seen from Table 5, they witnessed
a signiﬁcant decline in their rates of growth of spending. It would be interesting to see whether
the program had any adverse eﬀect on this group. However, since Proposal A held these districts
harmless, they only suﬀered a decline in their rates of growth of spending, not in the absolute
spending levels. So any adverse eﬀects would show up in the rates of change in performance. It
seems that this would ideally need a longer time-series to say anything deﬁnite.
One important question in Michigan is the sustainability of this reform. The most debated area
is that of local control - the richer districts can be expected to exert considerable pressure over the
years if they are unable to spend as much as desired. This would be particularly pressing if, like
California, there is a drop in overall support for education. As of now, however, the program is
quite popular.
70 For example, some people with high preferences for schooling who erstwhile had been living in richer districts
may now move back - one beneﬁt of living in high property-value districts is no longer operative. On the other hand,
because of the staggered nature of the reforms people may in fact move to the highest spending districts, which will
continue to have higher spending for a while.
71 One interesting point to note in this respect is the recent debate on whether the presence of elderly may negatively
impinge on expenditures on schooling. Poterba (1997) argues, using state level data, that this has indeed been the
case in the U.S. Harris et al (2001) concur, but they ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects are more signiﬁcant at the state
level, and only modest at the district level. With an imminent rise in the share of the elderly, this should be of some
concern to states with centralized school ﬁnancing, where the elderly and others cannot sort themselves into districts
based on their preferred levels of school spending.
27Appendix I: Whether Public School Eﬀort should go up after the Reforms
I brieﬂy discuss whether one should expect public school eﬀort to go up after the ﬁnance reforms.
Unfortunately, there is no unanimity in the literature as how to model public school behavior, so I
consider diﬀerent possible speciﬁcations.
First, following the school choice literature, I model public schools as being ‘rent maximizers’.
Formally, I assume that they choose eﬀort level e to maximize their rent R, which I deﬁne as net
revenues, or revenues minus costs
R = p ∗ N(e) − C(N,e)
Here N is the enrollment of the public school district, assumed to depend positively on public
school eﬀort e (but N is concave in e). p is the per pupil spending and C is the cost function of
the public school, assumed convex in both N and e.
The ﬁrst-order condition for rent maximization is (p − CN) ∗ N(e) = Ce, which determines the
optimal public school eﬀort.72 (We assume here that p > CN, i.e. enrolling the marginal student
is always proﬁtable for the public school.)
The eﬀects of a school ﬁnance reform can be modeled as an increase in p, at least for the lowest










which is positive if p > C1
N. The explanation is intuitive - an increase in p increases the payoﬀ from
the marginal eﬀort exerted by the district, and it is proﬁtable for the school to increase e to attract
more students. Note however that the result depends crucially on Ne  = 0. In Table 4 I saw that
72 The second order condition is satisﬁed if CNe is either positive or not too negative. This will hold if e.g. C(N,e)
is separable in N and e - for simplicity I assume C(N,e) = C
1(N) + C
2(e) in what follows.
28in Michigan most of the lowest spending districts are located in rural areas, where transportation
costs may make N quite inelastic with respect to e. In this case one would not expect e to change
by much following the reform.
Conversely, if the highest spending districts are constrained in their spending, this will be
equivalent to a fall in p, and may lead to diminished eﬀort. It is conceivable that there will be a
leveling down of school eﬀort - not much change in the lowest spending districts, but a signiﬁcant
decline in the richer ones, for whom N(e) may be quite elastic.73 Another channel by which the
same thing can happen is if higher public school eﬀort is capitalized in rising house prices through
an increase in test scores. This will increase the budget of the school, which is ﬁnanced primarily
through property taxes under local ﬁnance.74 In other words, under local ﬁnance p may be an
increasing function of eﬀort level e. Then the optimal eﬀort would solve (p−C1
N)∗Ne = C2
e −pe∗N
- as is intuitively obvious, if pe = 0 under state ﬁnance, then the public school exerts a lower eﬀort,
ceteris paribus. The extra beneﬁt of higher subsequent expenditures is no longer relevant when the
state equalizes all school budgets.
Another possible scenario is where schools are constrained in their expenditures. Assume that
eﬀort is costly, but the public school has to oﬀer a minimum quality to their customers, even
with budgetary restrictions. Formally, let total school expenditures E consist of local support (L)
and state aid (S), both assumed given, and let quality Q be a positive function of eﬀort e and
expenditures E, Q = Q(e,E). If the threshold quality level that can be oﬀered is Qmin, then an
increase in S will lead to a decline in public school eﬀort. Intuitively, with an increase in state aid
the school can aﬀord to cut back on its eﬀort, which it will do so since eﬀort is costly.
Finally, a variant of this where public schools will increase eﬀort is where they are maximizing
quality net of costs, i.e. where they are choosing e to maximize Q(e,E) − C(e), given E. It
73 A program of school choice, such as charter schools in Michigan, will make N(e) even more elastic.
74 This assumes that if house prices rise, residents will just bear the higher school expenditures rather than giving
themselves a tax break. This is not obvious - one needs a fuller model to work out the implications.
29follows immediately that de
dE =
−QeE
Qee−Cee > 0 if e and E are complements in production, as is likely.
Intuitively, even otherwise motivated teachers may be hampered by larger class sizes, antiquated
equipments, etc. - it is common to hear teachers and administrators complaining of lack of resources
aﬀecting productivity.
Appendix II: Choosing Control States for Michigan
I conﬁne myself to the Midwestern states neighboring Michigan, viz., Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
Minnesota and Wisconsin. The obvious criteria for selecting control states among these ﬁve are
ﬁrst, the absence of any important educational initiatives during the ’90s, particularly the second
half, and second, the availability of test score data similar to Michigan’s. Based on these, Indiana
and Ohio ﬁt the bill best. There have not been any major school-related programs in either state
during this period.75 Further, both states have got test score data in grades and subjects similar
to Michigan’s, Indiana also has district level data on both SAT and ACT tests from 1997.
As for the other states, Wisconsin changed in its school ﬁnance system in 1997, moving to a
three-tier equalization aid formula from a two-tier one. Further, the state switched to a new set of
tests in 1997-98, so that the pre and post-1997 scores are not strictly comparable. For Minnesota
too, test score data are available only for the later years - 3rd and 5th grade tests in Reading and
Math were administered only from 1998 onwards. Finally, Illinois instituted major changes in its
school ﬁnance programs in spring and winter of 1997. Illinois also looks diﬀerent from Michigan in
the organization of school districts and in ethnic composition of its students, see Table A-1(a).
Table A-1 summarizes the district and student characteristics in these ﬁve states, together with
their performance in SAT, ACT and NAEP. Ohio and Indiana do not look much diﬀerent from
Michigan, except that in Indiana the more popular college prep test is SAT.
75 Though following an adverse court ruling in 1997, Ohio had tried to explicitly tie its base funding levels to
spending in districts in which students scored well on state tests. The only other exception is the school voucher
program in Cleveland which began in 1997. Since there are more than 600 school districts in Ohio, omitting Cleveland
is not a big concern. In any case, including or excluding Cleveland does not change the qualitative results.
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33Table 1: Increases in Foundation Allowances, post-reform Michigan
(Selected districts at diﬀerent points of pre-reform spending distribution)
District 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Standish Sterling 3738 4200 4506 4816 5124 5170 5700 6000
Delton-Kellogg 4501 4740 4988 5235 5462 5462 5700 6000
Kearsley Community 5008 5227 5380 5535 5689 5689 5927 6227
Carman-Ainsworth 6002 6181 6334 6489 6643 6643 6881 7182
Warren Woods 7069 7239 7392 7547 7701 7701 7824 7997
Grant Township 10,681 10,841 10,994 11,149 11,303 11,303 11,484 11,737
FA in Grant Town/
FA in Standish-Sterling 286 258 244 231 221 219 201 196
Source: Michigan Department of Education.
Table 2: Summary Measures of Inequality in Michigan before and after Proposal A
General Fund Expenditures Estimates Estimates
Michigan from Kentucky from court-ordered reforms
1994 2001 % change % change % change
1994-2001 1990-2000 10 years after
Ln(95th/5th) 0.562 0.395 -29.72 -32.80 -16
Gini Coeﬃcient 0.104 0.084 -19.23 -28.68 -19
Theil Index 0.017 0.011 -35.29 -35
Coeﬃcient of Variation 0.190 0.151 -20.53 -33.33 -17
Ln(95th/5th) is deﬁned as the log of the ratio of school spending at the 95th and 5th percentiles. All statistics have
been weighted by district enrollment. The results for Kentucky come from Clark (2003). The last column shows the







Median Income * Year 1994 -0.05 -0.10
∗∗ -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)










Observations 2079 2079 2075
R-squared 0.74 0.82 0.80
See equation (1) in the text. Column (1) shows the un-weighted estimates, while columns (2) and (3) are weighted
by respective district enrollment. All regressions control for racial composition, location of the district (proportion
rural) and size. Column (3) excludes Detroit, which alone accounts for about 10% of Michigan’s K-12 population.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
+,
∗,
∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Diﬀerent Groups of Michigan School Districts, 1994
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Lowest Spending Lower Middle Middle Group Upper Middle Highest Spending
Group Group Group Group
Ethnicity (Percentage)
Whites 93.90 91.38 93.40 57.28 (83.75) 81.64 (84.42)
Blacks 1.97 3.68 2.06 36.33 (10.59) 13.43 (10.60)
Hispanics 2.47 2.21 2.50 3.90 (3.25) 1.27 (1.23)
Asians 0.63 0.72 0.94 1.46 (1.44) 2.57 (2.79)
Free Lunch Eligibility 23.74 18.67 16.30 32.38 (17.87) 15.50 (13.82)
Average District Size 1788 1912 2323 5641 4224
Average School Size 457 458 493 558 (514) 520 (500)
Proportion Rural 75.62 68.64 56.03 16.15 (26.67) 8.80 (9.98)
4th grade Reading (MEAP) 43.50 44.64 44.47 41.11 (42.38) 48.60 (50.41)
4th grade Math (MEAP) 47.59 50.92 51.34 47.04 (49.01) 54.92 (57.10)
For Groups 4 and 5, the ﬁgures in parentheses correspond to the statistics when I leave out the 3 and 2 most populous districts in those
groups respectively. All ﬁgures have been weighted by enrollment of the districts in 1994.Table 5: Pre and Post-reform Trends in Spending, Michigan - FE Regressions, 1990-2001
General Fund General Fund Teacher Student-Teacher
Revenues Expenditures Salaries Ratios
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1)
Trend (t) 346∗∗ 360∗∗ 281∗∗ 316∗∗ 2224∗∗ 0.64∗∗
(18.63) (18.34) (17.23) (17.94) (134.50) (0.11)
Group 1 * t -134∗∗ -144∗∗ -54∗∗ -86∗∗ -564∗∗ -0.29∗
(20.24) (19.85) (18.78) (19.16) (171.84) (0.13)
G r o u p2*t - 9 8 ∗∗ -115∗∗ -34+ -73∗∗ -426∗∗ -0.31∗
(21.45) (22.53) (19.64) (21.60) (165.91) (0.12)
G r o u p3*t - 8 6 ∗∗ -100∗∗ -38∗ -73∗∗ -384∗ -0.15
(21.15) (20.12) (19.23) (19.69) (163.16) (0.12)
G r o u p4*t - 7 1 ∗ -64∗∗ -11 -56∗∗ -130 0.29
(28.59) (21.95) (37.53) (21.51) (276.26) (0.18)
Reform * t -124∗∗ -139∗∗ -33+ -71∗∗ -1590∗∗ -0.90∗∗
(20.79) (20.31) (19.60) (20.49) (157.97) (0.11)
Group 1 * reform * t 251∗∗ 261∗∗ 135∗∗ 166∗∗ 892∗∗ 0.09
(22.77) (22.43) (21.66) (22.36) (196.29) (0.14)
Group 2 * reform * t 151∗∗ 172∗∗ 68∗∗ 112∗∗ 761∗∗ 0.25+
(24.02) (25.15) (22.57) (24.96) (194.14) (0.13)
Group 3 * reform * t 88∗∗ 105∗∗ 17 59∗∗ 491∗∗ 0.13
(23.50) (22.44) (21.83) (22.58) (188.78) (0.13)
Group 4 * reform * t 105∗∗ 67∗∗ 24 49∗ -10 -0.14
(33.43) (24.59) (43.75) (24.72) (350.41) (0.23)
Observations 6269 5981 6269 5981 6266 6266
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.59
See equation (2) in the text. Group 5, the richest group of districts, is the omitted category. Columns
marked (1) include all 524 districts, (2) excludes the 24 districts with 1994 enrollment more than 10,000.
All regressions are weighted by district enrollment and control for ethnic composition. For brevity I do not
report the other coeﬃcients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table 6: Eﬀect of Reform on Spending and Grade 4 Reading and Mathematics Scores, Michigan - 1993-2001
(FE Regressions with unrestricted year eﬀects)
GF Expenditures Reading Mathematics
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Group 1 * 1996 -224 10 -2.13+ -1.87 -1.63 -2.35+
(153.12) (57.63) (1.17) (1.23) (1.32) (1.33)
Group 2 * 1996 -235 10 -0.91 -0.54 0.47 -0.13
(152.10) (55.43) (1.16) (1.22) (1.24) (1.25)
Group 1 * 1997 61 73 -3.97∗∗ -2.46∗ -3.16∗∗ -2.89∗
(58.83) (52.67) (1.42) (1.05) (1.07) (1.16)
Group 2 * 1997 46 65 -2.98∗ -1.26 -0.86 -0.43
(54.05) (47.35) (1.48) (1.12) (1.11) (1.19)
Group 1 * 1998 203∗∗ 200∗∗ -1.94+ -1.43 -0.30 1.00
(59.41) (52.39) (1.14) (1.19) (1.40) (1.23)
Group 2 * 1998 180∗∗ 191∗∗ 0.70 1.35 1.05 2.50∗
(60.31) (53.37) (1.13) (1.18) (1.38) (1.20)
Group 1 * 1999 133∗∗ 207∗∗ 2.25 1.18 1.55 1.84+
(55.49) (47.62) (1.73) (0.99) (1.06) (1.12)
Group 2 * 1999 90∗∗ 179∗∗ 4.65∗ 2.73∗∗ 2.58∗ 3.02∗∗
(58.93) (51.75) (1.79) (1.09) (1.07) (1.14)
Group 1 * 2000 289∗∗ 309∗∗ -5.91∗∗ -4.41∗∗ 0.56 0.84
(59.34) (51.90) (1.33) (1.07) (1.15) (1.13)
Group 2 * 2000 147∗∗ 186∗∗ -2.19 -0.52 0.86 1.34
(62.25) (55.43) (1.40) (1.14) (1.16) (1.12)
Group 1 * 2001 424∗∗ 374∗∗ 2.43∗ 1.21 3.53∗∗ 2.19+
(72.28) (61.96) (1.24) (1.11) (1.35) (1.32)
Group 2 * 2001 228∗∗ 201∗∗ 2.45∗ 1.37 2.69∗ 1.52
(79.55) (69.57) (1.46) (1.35) (1.35) (1.32)
Observations 6269 6257 4606 4599 4606 4599
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88
See equation (3) in the text. Group 4 is the omitted category. Columns marked (1) include all 524 districts,
while (2) excludes Detroit. For brevity, I do not report the other coeﬃcients. All regressions are weighted and
control for ethnicity, gender, enrollment and free lunch eligibility. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
+, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table 7: Cohort-based Analysis for Groups 1 and 2, Michigan - FE Regressions
(Reading and Mathematics, 4th and 7th grades)
Group 1 Cohorts Group 2 Cohorts
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Reading
4th grade in 1993 -4.10∗∗ -3.72∗ -4.59∗∗ -4.15∗∗
(7th grade in 1996) (1.57) (1.59) (1.60) (1.66)
4th grade in 1994 -5.02∗∗ -5.37∗∗ -3.54∗∗ -3.55∗
(7th grade in 1997) (1.36) (1.47) (1.38) (1.50)
4th grade in 1995 -1.04 -0.65 -0.39 0.05
(7th grade in 1998) (1.35) (1.41) (1.61) (1.66)
4th grade in 1996 1.61 1.37 0.10 0.07
(7th grade in 1999) (1.62) (1.72) (1.66) (1.71)
4th grade in 1997 -0.68 -0.34 -1.78 -1.60
(7th grade in 2000) (1.76) (1.91) (1.76) (1.87)
4th grade in 1998 1.98 1.15 -0.53 -1.22
(7th grade in 2001) (1.38) (1.35) (1.45) (1.42)
Mathematics
4th grade in 1993 -0.79 0.05 -2.55 -1.64
(7th grade in 1996) (1.82) (1.90) (1.81) (1.91)
4th grade in 1994 -0.69 -0.76 -1.92 -1.85
(7th grade in 1997) (2.01) (2.00) (1.96) (1.97)
4th grade in 1995 1.35 2.54 0.04 1.20
(7th grade in 1998) (1.70) (1.62) (2.15) (2.08)
4th grade in 1996 4.47∗∗ 4.67∗∗ 2.33 2.57
(7th grade in 1999) (1.82) (1.87) (2.00) (2.00)
4th grade in 1997 4.53∗ 4.62∗ 1.94 1.91
(7th grade in 2000) (1.80) (1.71) (2.09) (1.93)
See equation (4). The table reports the values of β1 and β2 for the diﬀerent cohorts (a separate regression is
run for each cohort). Group 4 is the omitted category. Columns marked (1) include all 524 districts, while
(2) includes only those with less than 800 4th grade test takers for the particular cohort. All regressions are
weighted by the number of test takers and control for ethnicity, gender, enrollment and free lunch eligibility.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 8: Eﬀect of General Fund Expenditure (GFE) on grade 4 MEAP Scores, Michigan
(Reading and Mathematics, 1996-2001 and 1998-2001)
1996-2001 1998-2001






∗ 0.022 0.024 0.027
∗∗ 0.027
∗∗ -0.003 0.040 0.046
+
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.026)
R
2 0.40 0.40 0.74 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.23 0.73 0.14 0.14
Panel B
lag GFE 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.056
∗∗ 0.034 -0.003 -0.010 -0.028 0.037 0.029
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.021) (0.035) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.037) (0.049)
R
2 0.51 0.51 0.82 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.84 0.10 0.12
Panel C
lag GFE 0.005 -0.009 0.004 0.022 0.034
+ 0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.053
+ 0.054
∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.027)
R













(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.029) (0.028)
R
2 0.38 0.38 0.74 0.50 0.49 0.17 0.17 0.74 0.05 0.04
Panel B
lag GFE 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.053
∗ 0.040 -0.006 -0.017 -0.038
+ -0.012 -0.021
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.021) (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.031) (0.040)
R
2 0.57 0.57 0.85 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.49 0.87 0.13 0.13
Panel C
lag GFE 0.012
∗ 0.005 0.011 0.059
∗∗ 0.082
∗∗ 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.060 0.062
∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.021) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026)
R
2 0.53 0.53 0.84 0.58 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.85 0.09 0.06
Lag GFE is GFE lagged one year. All coeﬃcients are in terms of 10
−1. Panels A and B include all 524 school districts, Panel C excludes
Detroit. Panels B and C are weighted by respective district enrollments. All regressions include separate year dummies and control
for racial and gender compositions and free lunch eligibility. There are 2507 (1996-2001) and 1673 (1998-2001) observations each for




signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table 9: Eﬀect of Foundation Allowances on General Fund Expenditures, Michigan (IV First Stage Regressions)
Panel A Panel C
1996-2001 1998-2001 1996-2001 1998-2001
Foundation Allowance (FA) 0.76∗∗ (0.07) 0.91∗∗ (0.12) 0.72∗∗ (0.07) 0.73∗∗ (0.12)
FA * 1997 0.10+ (0.05) 0.07 (0.06)
FA * 1998 0.16∗∗ (0.06) 0.10 (0.06)
FA * 1999 0.13 (0.08) -0.03∗ (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) -0.10 (0.07)
FA * 2000 0.01 (0.02) -0.07 (0.07) 0.02 (0.02) -0.07 (0.07)
FA * 2001 0.23+ (0.12) 0.04 (0.10) 0.19 (0.13) 0.05 (0.12)
Observations 2511 1676 2501 1669
F-statistic of joint signiﬁcance 29.62 17.04 31.71 11.98
of excluded instruments
For brevity, I only report the results for the FE-IV(1) regressions. Panel A includes all 524 districts, Panel C excludes Detroit.
Panel C results are weighted by number of test-takers in the 4th grade in the district. All regressions include separate year
dummies and control for racial and gender compositions and free lunch eligibility. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 10: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Number of Per Capita Persons Children Unemployment Adults who are Adults with
Persons Income in Poverty in Poverty Rate HS grads BA degree







(327.43) (255.29) (0.33) (0.56) (0.33) (0.44) (0.41)
Group 2 * t 906
+ -30 1.14
∗ 1.43
+ 0.67 -0.70 0.79
(501.02) (325.27) (0.48) (0.72) (0.46) (0.59) (0.51)
Group 3 * t 1571
+ 262 1.17
∗∗ 0.96 0.58 -0.59 0.45
(675.64) (303.63) (0.45) (0.74) (0.39) (0.60) (0.52)
Group 4 * t 2437
+ 286 0.89 -0.59 -0.05 0.21 0.65
(1388.09) (432.00) (1.07) (1.72) (1.06) (0.87) (0.90)







(2069.14) (514.48) (0.48) (0.71) (0.41) (0.54) (0.83)
Group 1 is the omitted category. All regressions are weighted by the number of persons in the district in 1990. There are 523
districts in each year, 1990 and 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
+,
∗,
∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent levels.Table 11: Concentration of Charter Schools across Diﬀerent Groups, Michigan, 1996-2001
Percentage of Students in Charter Schools
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lowest Spending Group 0.10 0.29 0.58 0.84 0.96 1.07
Lower Middle Group 0.10 0.41 0.61 0.95 1.24 1.46
Middle Group 0.25 0.63 1.14 1.60 2.13 2.45
Upper Middle Group 0.27 0.78 1.33 1.91 2.63 3.03
Highest Spending Group 0.31 0.71 1.41 2.03 2.77 3.26
Michigan 0.25 0.68 1.25 1.95 2.71 3.40
Author’s calculations. In Michigan, charter schools are attached to an intermediate school district (ISD) rather than
to individual school districts. The table shows the average ISD-wide percentages of charter students across various
groups, e.g., a student in the lowest spending group in 2000 would on average belong to an ISD where 0.96% of the
students are enrolled in charter schools. The data in the last row (Michigan) come from Arsen et al (2001).
Table 12: Trends in School Spending, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio, 1995-2000 - FE Regressions
Michigan Indiana Ohio








(10.22) (9.19) (11.31) (10.90) (23.12) (23.70)




(11.48) (10.43) (39.62) (17.51) (15.79) (14.29)




(11.92) (10.95) (17.65) (17.24) (15.38) (14.93)
Observations 3642 3628 1746 1740 3626 3614
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.94
For brevity I do not report the other coeﬃcients. Columns marked (1) include all districts (except Detroit in
Michigan). Columns marked (2) exclude Flint and Grand Rapids in Michigan (in addition to Detroit), Indianapolis
in Indiana, and Cleveland and Columbus in Ohio. All regressions are weighted by enrollment and control for ethnicity.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
+,
∗,
∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table 13: Changes in Michigan NAEP Scores net of the changes in Nation, Indiana and Ohio, 1992-2000
4th grade Mathematics 8th grade Mathematics
Nation Indiana Ohio Nation Indiana Ohio
1992-96 1996-00 1992-96 1996-00 1992-00 1992-96 1996-00 1992-96 1996-00 1992-00
Average Scale Score +3 +1 -2 0 -1 +6 -2 +4 -6 -4
(3.17) (2.87) (2.56) (2.42) (2.82) (4.27) (4.17) (2.89) (3.12) (3.01)
Average Scale Score - Black +5 -3 +3 -8 +2 +8 -8 +10 -17 -11
(5.48) (4.82) (5.82) (5.21) (5.64) (4.80) (5.20) (5.25) (5.72) (5.38)
Average Scale Score - Hispanic -5 -1 -6 0 -6 -5 +8 -4 0 -14
(4.54) (5.42) (4.89) (6.51) (6.42) (6.38) (6.45) (8.82) (8.72) (8.38)
Percent at or above Basic +2 -1 -5 -2 -5 +4 -1 +1 -5 -4
(3.38) (3.20) (3.72) (3.47) (3.92) (4.13) (3.24) (3.68) (3.86) (3.81)
Percent at or above Procient +2 +1 -3 -1 +1 +6 -3 +5 -7 -4
(2.71) (2.81) (2.99) (3.25) (3.47) (2.81) (3.05) (3.13) (3.66) (3.23)
Score at 10th percentile +5 -2 +1 -2 +6 +1 -3 +1 -5 -6
(4.91) (3.96) (5.65) (6.47) (6.61) (9.75) (9.91) (4.11) (5.07) (4.17)
Score at 25th percentile +3 -1 -2 -2 -4 +4 0 +2 -5 -6
(5.25) (4.65) (3.48) (2.93) (3.88) (6.08) (5.86) (4.17) (4.43) (4.48)
Score at 50th percentile +2 +2 -3 0 -1 +6 -3 +5 -7 -3
(3.72) (2.88) (2.97) (3.41) (3.73) (4.16) (4.19) (3.33) (3.50) (2.96)
The cells report the changes in Michigan scores net of the changes in Indiana, Ohio and the Nation. See NAEP, The Nation's Report Card (State Proles)
for details about the categories. Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 14: Trends in Participation and Scores, ACT and SAT
(Michigan and Indiana, 1997-2001)
Participation Average Scores
Michigan Indiana Michigan Indiana
ACT ACT SAT ACT ACT SAT
Group 1 * 1998 0.23 -1.80+ -0.23 -0.14 0.20 -1.32
(1.35) (1.04) (1.52) (0.09) (0.44) (2.70)
Group 2 * 1998 0.37 -1.51 -0.26 -0.05 0.35 -2.36
(1.21) (0.84) (1.44) (0.09) (0.47) (3.25)
Group 1 * 1999 -0.59 1.19 2.12 -0.11 -0.01 -3.63
(1.41) (0.97) (1.54) (0.10) (0.43) (3.07)
Group 2 * 1999 -0.44 0.67 1.40 0.16 0.59 0.95
(1.39) (0.95) (1.45) (0.09) (0.48) (2.90)
Group 1 * 2000 0.45 3.51∗∗ 0.68 -0.03 0.02 -0.74
(1.35) (1.17) (1.61) (0.10) (0.42) (2.99)
Group 2 * 2000 1.44 -0.43 2.08 0.09 0.27 -3.15
(1.30) (0.91) (1.46) (0.09) (0.46) (2.95)
Group 1 * 2001 0.40 4.25∗∗ 1.31 -0.01 0.22 0.63
(1.38) (1.16) (1.46) (0.10) (0.44) (3.06)
Group 2 * 2001 -0.62 -0.19 0.02 0.05 0.77 0.21
(1.33) (1.17) (1.74) (0.09) (0.49) (3.27)
See equation (6) in the text. All the groups are based on base-year spending (1994 for Michigan, 1995 for Indiana) and
Group 4 is the omitted category. All regressions are weighted by 12th grade enrollment and control for ethnicity and free
lunch. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table A-1(a): Selected Characteristics of K-12 Schooling in Michigan and ﬁve Mid-western States, 2001-2002
Total Number of Students Expenditure P-T Fr./Red. Asian Hisp. Black White
Enrollment Districts per District (1999-2000) Ratio Lunch
Ohio 1,830,985 615 2977 $7,065 15.0 27.4 1.2 1.8 16.5 78.9
Indiana 996,133 304 3277 $7,192 16.7 31.1 1.0 3.9 11.8 83.0
Wisconsin 879,361 434 2026 $7,806 14.4 26.0 3.4 5.0 10.2 80.1
Minnesota 851,384 439 1939 $7,190 16.0 26.4 5.2 3.8 7.0 82.0
Illinois 2,071,391 1,011 2049 $7,133 16.0 35.2 3.5 16.2 21.2 59.0
Michigan 1,730,668 573 3020 $8,110 17.5 31.2 2.0 3.6 20.0 73.4
Source: Common Core of Data, National Center for Education Statistics. P-T ratio stands for the pupil-teacher ratio. The
column ‘Fr./Red. Lunch’ shows the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch. The last four columns show the
percentages of students in each ethnic group.
Table A-1(b): Participation and Performance in SAT, ACT and NAEP (4th grade), Michigan and ﬁve Mid-western States
SAT ACT (2001) NAEP Reading (1992) NAEP Math (1996) NAEP Math (2000)
Score Tested Score Tested Score Basic Prof. Score Basic Prof. Score Basic Prof.
Ohio 1073 26 21.4 63 217 63 27 231 73 26
Indiana 1000 60 21.4 20 221 68 30 229 72 24 234 78 31
Wisconsin 1180 6 22.2 68 224 71 33 231 74 27
Minnesota 1169 9 22.1 66 221 68 31 232 76 29 235 78 34
Illinois 1165 12 21.6 71 225 66 21
Michigan 1133 11 21.3 69 216 62 26 226 68 23 231 72 29
Source: The Nation’s Report Card, National Center for Education Statistics. The columns under ‘Basic’ show the percentage of
test-takers scoring at or above the Basic level, similarly for ‘Prof.’ (Proﬁcient). See the source for details about the categories. 
 
 
   
 
 
     
      Figure 1. Spending in 1994 and 2001, Groups 1 and 5 
Revenues 
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    Figure 2. Test Scores in 1995 and 2001, Groups 1 and 5 
Reading 
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficients on Groups 1 and 2 from regressions of 
equation (4), as reported in Table 7. The small circles represent the estimated values, 
while the lines show the respective 95% confidence interval bands. Cohorts are identified 
by the year they were in 4
th grade, e.g. the 1993 cohort is the one that was in 4
th grade in 
1993 and in 7
th grade in 1996. 
 
 
Figure 3: Gain between 4th and 7th grades for Groups 1 and 
2 Cohorts 
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